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I. INTRODUCTION 
COMPARATIVE human rights law (CHRL) is another name for the comparison of human 
rights law or, more simply, human rights comparison. 
Like comparative constitutional law, another field of comparative law wf th which it overlaps 
to the extent that constitutional law often includes human rights guarantees, it is blooming. 
It has established itself, since the mid-199os, as an important dimension of the study of 
domestic and international human rights law, 1 but also, and not unlike comparative consti-
tutional law in this respect, as part of the practice of domestic and international human 
rights institutions. 2 Some even consider it a distinct field oflegal scholarship, 3 and, respectively, 
an independent set of legal principles in practice. 4 
As often, however, with success comes contestation. Today, controversies abound 
regarding the boundaries, the authority, and the methods of CHRL. Debates about the 
delineations and scope of CHRL began already in the late 199os.5 The .2000s saw the rise 
of normative discussions about the autqority of CHRL and its potential justifications. 6 
Finally, as a sign of coming of age, human rights comparatists started to discuss methodo-
logical questions after 2010.7 
In reaction to these waves of controversy, the first three sections (after the Introduction) 
of the present chapter are devoted, respectively, to the clarification of the boundaries 
1 See, e.g., Kai Moller, The Gobal Model of Constitutional Rights (2012); Todd Landman, Protecting 
Human Rights: A Comparative Study (2005); Philip Alston (ed), Promoting Human Rights Through Bills 
of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (1999). 
2 See, e.g., Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: 
Comparative Judicial Engagement (2014); Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau (eds), The Use of 
Foreign Precedent by Constitutional Judges (2013); Michal Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European 
Supreme Courts (2013); Jeremy Waldron, 'Partly Laws Common to All Mankind': Foreign Law in American 
Courts (2012). 
3 See, e.g., Ran Hirschi, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law 
(2014); Stephen Gardbaum, 'How Do and Should We Compare Constitutional Law?: in Samantha Besson, 
Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, and Samuel Jube (eds), Comparing Comparative Law (2017), 109 ff. 
4 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, 'Human Rights: Universalism or the Integrity of a Common Enterprise?: 
1 March 2017, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No 16- 48. Available at <https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2848611>. 
5 See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, 'Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights', (2000) 204 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4, 499 ff. 
6 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, 'Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentiun1, (2005) 119 Harvard LR 1, 129 ff; 
Jeremy Waldron, 'Rights and the Citation of Foreign Law', in Tom Campbell, K. D. Ewing and Adam 
Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection of Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (2011), 410 ff; Christopher 
Mccrudden, 'Comparative International Law and Human Rights: A Value-Added Approacll, in Anthea 
Roberts et al (eds), Comparative International Law (2018), 439-458. 
7 See, e.g., David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, 'The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalisnl, 
(2011) 99:5 California LR 1163 ff; Mila Versteeg, 'Law versus Norms: The Impact of Human Rights Treaties 
on Constitutional Rights', (2015) 171:1 Journµl of Institutional and Theoretical Econom ics 87 ff; Christopher 
McCrudden, 'Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? A Comparative International 
Law Analysis of CEDAW', (2015) 1n American Journal of International Law 534 ff; Gardbaum (n. 3); 
Christopher Mccrudden, 'CEDAW in National Courts: A Case Study in Operationalizing Comparative 
International Law Analysis in a Human Rights Context', in Anthea Roberts et al (eds), Comparative 
International Law (2018), 459-500. 
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(Section II), t~e methods (Section III), and the legitimate authority of CHRL (Section IV). 
The final sect10n of the chapter addresses three currently debated issues pertaining to its 
methods, scope, and actors (Section V). 
Of course, one may be tempted to approach CHRL as a sub-field either of comparative 
constitutional law in which comparatists compare domestic constitutional rights, or of 
comparative international law8 in which comparatists look at the domestic practice of 
international human rights law. Although CHRL may overlap with both of them, a ke 
characteristic of CHRL, and one that is central to this chapter's argument, is its dual domestic~ 
international dimension. Unlike other parts of constitutional and international law, human 
rights law draws its sources from both domestic and international law at the same time and 
those sources are mutually validated in human rights law-making.9 The gist of the chapter's 
argument, t~erefore, is that it is the domestic- international dual legality (or transnationality1o) 
of human nghts law that explains why human rights law-making should amount to a com-
par~tive projec~. It sho~ld be approached as a law-making enterprise in which comparative 
law is not only mterestmg, but required and constitutive, on the one hand, and that should 
not only amount to a piecemeal and retail practice, but to a systematic and universal one 
on the other. ' 
The universality of the human rights project requires developing a concern for the sys-
tematicity and legitimacy of CHRL, however. 11 On the proposed model, indeed, CHRL 
should amount to more than an exotic recreational activity for curious academics and a 
st~ate?ic tool in the hands of activist judges. As this chapter argues, this can only be done by 
bnngmg more legal theory into discussions of CHRL. 
II. THE BOUNDARIES OF COMPARATIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
This firs~ section maps t~e terrain of CHRL and looks in particular at what comparing 
human nghts means (Sect10n ILI) and at how it developed historically (Section Il.2). It also 
draws some distinctions between sub-fields ofCHRL (Section II.3). 
8 See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Pa.ul ~· Stephan, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, and Mila Versteeg, 'Comparative 
lnte,rnat10nal Law: .Fra~mg the Field, (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 3, 467 ff. See also 
the McCrudden tn~ogy : Mc~rudd~n, 'Why Do ~ational Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties?' 
(n ~); McCrudden, CEDAW m National Courts (n 7); McCrudden (n 6). 
See, e.g., Samantha Besson, 'Human Rights and Constitutional Law-Patterns of Mutual Validation 
and Legitimation', in Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao, and Massimo Renzo (eds), Philosophical Foundations 
of Human Rights (2015), 279 ff; Gerald Neuman 'Human Rights and Constitutional Rights-Harmony 
and Dissonance', (2003) 55:5 Stanford LR 1863 ff. 
10
• See. Samantha Besson, 'Human Rights as Transnational Constitutional Law', in Anthony Lang and 
A~tle Wiener (eds), Handbook on Global Constitutionalism (2017), 234 ff. 
Waldron (n 2), 20-3. See also Roger P. Alford, 'In Search of a Theory for Constitutional 
Comparativisrn', (2005) 52 UCLA LR 3, 639 ff. 
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i. Notion 
t 
Human rights comparison may be approached both as a method of legal reasoning and as 
the outcome of that reasoning. 
First of all, comparison amounts to a mode, process, or method of investigation or access 
to knowledge, 12 and this is also true of legal comparison and of human rights comparison 
in particular. According to Jeremy Waldron, comparison belongs to the 'legal episteme', to 
the extent that through comparison 'we [lawyers] stand to gain in terms of our acquisition 
and manipulation of specifically legal knowledge, knowledge oflegal analysis',13 and not so 
much (or not only, at least) knowledge of empirical facts or moral arguments. 
To that extent, it is even more important than in other comparative disciplines or prac-
tices to distinguish legal comparison from other exercises of judgement one encounters in 
legal reasoning, and human rights reasoning in particular. Such distinctions are made 
difficult by the fact that comparison is so central to legal reasoning that it is often not explicit 
or, worse, combined with other, different, normative operations. This fuzziness surrounding 
legal comparison may explain the emergence of the broader and encompassing notions of 
'migration' or 'circulation' oflegal principles, including human rights conceptions, that may 
occur with or without actual comparison. The same may be said about 'judicial dialogue' or 
'comity': they may, but need not, include comparison of judicial practices, and, conversely, 
judicial comparison may occur without dialogue or comity between judges. 
Second, the outcome of the comparison, ie the differences but, mostly, the commonalities 
identified by comparison, may also count as (part of) the comparison itself. This is particularly 
important for legal comparison to the extent that it also goes by the name of 'comparative 
law', thereby placing the emphasis on its result, ie a potential set of common principles 
identified by comparison that amount to law. 
In CHRL, the commonalities identified by comparison are also sometimes referred to, by 
practitioners and scholars alike, as the human rights 'common ground' or 'consensus'. 14 That 
human rights consensus is identified through the ' [i]ncreasingly frequent cross-references 
between various international and domestic courts interpreting provisions which are found 
in different [international human rights] treaties or domestic constitutions'.15 It also includes 
the outcome of human rights comparisons (i) made by other types of international and domes-
tic institutions (for instance, the legislature or the executive), (ii) pertaining to international 
and domestic human rights' sources other than human rights treaties (for instance, customary 
law or general principles), and (iii) with respect to the making of human rights law as much 
as to its determination and implementation.16 Interestingly, some authors have also referred 
12 Christopher McCrudden, 'What Does Comparing (Law) Mean and What Should it Mean?', in 
Samantha Besson, Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, and Samuel Jube (eds), Comparing Comparative Law 
(2017), 61 ff, 70. 
13 See Waldron (n 2), 93- 100. 
14 See Waldron (n 2), 48- 9; Gerald Neuman, 'Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights', (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 1, 101 ff. 
15 Olivier de Schutter, International Human Rights Law (2Ild edn, 2014), 35 ff. 
16 See Besson (n 10); Christopher McCrudden, 'The Pluralism of Human Rights Adjudication', in 
Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden, and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial 
Engagement (2014) , 3 ff. 
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to that human rights consensus by resorting to historical legal concepts such as jus commune17 
or jus gentium.18 
Two clarifications are in order here: one about the transnational ambit of the human 
rights consensus and the other about the nature of that human rights consensus. 
Firstly, the common principles identified by comparative law are shared by most or all 
the units of observation and, to that extent, may be considered a 'transnational' consensus. 
Thus they should not be equated with those of one single unit of observation, and hence 
with foreign law itself. Of course, comparison may lead to borrowing directly from one or 
the other units of comparison, but this is a distinctive normative operation that is inde-
pendent from comparison and may not actually even require the latter in the first place. 
In fact, the use of'foreign law'19, or 'foreign precedent' when it is judicial, does not usu-
ally go by the name of comparative law. The latter is used to refer only to the outcome of 
comparison and to the features common to the different units compared:~0 Moreover, 
when those common features are observed between different judicial practices, the out-
come of the legal comparison, ie the transnational consensus as a whole, is mostly 
referred to as a 'transnational precedent'. While that transnational consensus may still be 
considered 'foreign' in cases where the legal order of reference in the comparison does 
not yet share its principles, it is not the law of one of the compared legal orders only, but 
of many at the same time. 
Second, the common principles identified by comparison and constitutive of comparative 
law are identified by the comparatist, usually but not necessarily a judge, when assessing 
the variations in the attributes or properties of the different legal orders considered. The 
so-called 'consensus' is not a matter of agreement between the latter, nor of consent of 
some of them (not even of the comparing legal order itself), but of an individual identifi-
cation of a common ground or set of principles through legal reasoning.21 That identifica-
tion may then be confirmed by other domestic legal institutions through further 
'boilerplating'22 of the common ground and/or by an international institution through 
'consolidating' of that common ground into international human rights law, as we will see. 
Importantly, then, the identification of a human rights consensus through comparison 
should not be equated with the negation of the persistence and pervasiveness of reasonable 
disagreement about human rights. 
In the remainder of this chapter, CHRL will thus be understood as both a process (the 
I 
comparison stricto sensu) and its outcome (the transnational consensus identified by com-
parison) and, with respect to the latter, as a systematic comparative or transnational legal 
outcome and not as piecemeal and one-to-one citation to foreign law. 
Drawing attention to the legal nature of CHRL qua outcome of legal comparison, espe-
cially when it is referred to as 'common law', is not symbolic. This has to do with the practical 
dimension of law and legal reasoning, and hence of legal comparison as an integral part 
of that practice. 23 The legality of CHRL raises the question whether comparative law, and 
17 See, e.g., de Schutter (n 15), 35 ff. 18 See Waldron (n 2), 27-47. 
19 See, e.g., Basil Markesinis and Jorg Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: A New Source of Inspiration? 
(2006); Vlad Perju, 'The Puzzling Parameters of the Foreign Law Debate; [2007) Utah LR 167 ff. 
20 See also Waldron (n 2), 48-9. 21 See idem, 108. 
22 See Waldron, 'Rights and the Citation of Foreign Law' (n 6); Waldron (n 4). 
23 See also Waldron (n 2), 93-100. 
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the common principles or transnational consensus it may identify, actually belong to the 
sources of law. It has rightly been argued that they can belong, in the way customary law 
does.24 Like custom, comparative law is non-written law, and it is identified by the obser:a-
tion of a general and regular practice that binds as law. Moreover, like custom, c~mparati~e 
law needs a legal institution, usually a judge, to identify it and hence to contnbute. to its 
validation. It should come as no surprise therefore that the method usually apphed to 
identify customary law, both domestic and international, is legal compari~on.in general and 
judicial comparison in particular. The same may be said of gener.al p~mciples of law ~s 
another source of law that comes close to comparative law, and this with respect to their 
identification by comparison, to their intricate ties to customary law and to their validation 
by a judge. Comparative law need not be approached as ~ distinct legal order, therefore, but, 
like customary law or general principles, it may be co~sidere~ a sour~e of ~~w that belongs 
to different legal orders at the same time, both domestic and mternational. 
2. Origins 
CHRL, as we know it today, dates back roughly to the mid-199os, both as a legal practice 
and as a scholarly subject.26 . 
Its emergence coincided with two concurrent phenomena:27 first, the ris~ of co~par.ative 
constitutional law at the end of the Cold War, and, with it, the increase m constitutional 
borrowings including in the drafting of bills of rights; and, second, the conso~idation. of 
international human rights law with the development of international human nghts adJU-
dication, and, with it, the resort to human rights comparisons by regional hu~an rights 
courts such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the Inter-Amencan Court 
of Human Rights in particular. 
Interestingly, earlier traces of CHRL may be found in the n.in~teent~ ce~tury, and to that 
extent CHRL is not unlike comparative constitutional law withm which it first developed. 
What differentiates those early kinds of CHRL from post-war ones, however, ~s, ~rst ~fall, 
the emergence of international human rights law from the 1930s onwards, culmmatmg m the 
post-war human rights treaties and their consolidation up to the 1970s. ~rom then on, the 
object of CHRL was no longer only domestic but also international human ~ights law .. A second 
distinctive feature related to the requirements of international hwnan nghts law is that the 
post-war CHRL practice is mostly judicial, both at the domest~c and interna~ional level 
(although there are exceptions) which is largely due to the human nght to an effective remedy, 
including to judicial revieW.28 . 
Of course, this historical account of the development of CHRL reflects a Western reahty, 
and mostly an Anglophone and Euro-American one. This shows not only from the legal 
24 See also idem, 56-9, 67- 75. 25 See also idem, 56-9, 67-75. 
2• Of course there had been antecedents in social sciences since the 1970s: e.g. Landman ~n 2); 
Kathleen Pritch~rd, 'Comparative Human Rights: Promise and Practice', in David Louis Cingr.anelh ( ed), 
Human Rights: Theory and Measurement (1988), 139 ff; Richard P. Claude (ed), Comparative Human 
Rights (1976). l d. 
2 1 See Christopher McCrudden, 'Human Rights Histories', (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Lega Stu ies 1, 
179 ff, 200 ff. 
28 See McCrudden (n 27), 200 ff. 
1228 SAMANTHA BESSON 
orders usually selected for human rights comparisons, but also from the questions raised, 
the methods applied, and the language(s) used. The practice and scholarship discussed in 
CHRL is indeed very much focused on human rights law in Europe (Western and then 
Eastern)- and especially Germany in that context-, the United States (US) and a few other 
countries, mostly Commonwealth states such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, 
South Africa, and, to some extent, Israel. In turn, this entails a selection of the researchers 
able to participate in CHRL, thereby self-reinforcing the Western bias over time. 
All this explains why CHRL may be accused of parochialism. 29 Yet, this critique is more 
problematic than in comparative constitutional law because international human rights law 
is universal in scope. The comparison and corresponding transnational consensus could, 
and, arguably, should therefore tend to be universal as well. The parochial features of 
CHRL could then have deleterious consequences for the legitimacy of both domestic and 
international human rights law given its centrality in their making and interp"ietation. 
3. Distinctions 
Human rights comparison may pertain to at least three different objects or units of 
observation given the multiple orders, regimes, and sources of that law. 
The first, and oldest kind of CHRL is comparative domestic human rights law. 30 It also 
comes closest to comparative constitutional law, both in history and in content, to the extent 
that comparative domestic human rights law relates to that part of domestic constitutional 
law that protects human rights. It focuses on horizontal comparisons of domestic human 
rights law without reference to (universal or regional) international human rights law. 
Early discussions in comparative domestic human rights law focused mostly on sub-
stantive issues, ie on the content and restrictions of individual human rights. However, 
macro-level discussions have also developed, including discussions of the comparative 
structure of human rights (e.g. sources or jurisdiction) and, even more recently, of their com-
parative institutional circumstances (e.g. constitutional entrenchment and judicial remedies). 
The second, and later, kind of CHRL is comparative international human rights law. 31 
It amounts to the horizontal comparison of international. human rights law and covers com-
peting universal and/ or regional regimes and die interaction between dieir monitoring bodies 
and these bodies' respective interpretations of those regimes. Like comparative domestic 
human rights law, comparative international human rights law consists of horizontal com-
parisons, but unlike comparative domestic human rights law, comparative international 
human rights law compares only international norms, without reference to dieir influence in 
domestic law or to their corresponding domestic human rights guarantees. 
Comparative international human rights law emerged with die development of international 
human rights law adjudication by international bodies in the 1990s. Regrettably, however, 
29 See also William Ewald, 'Rats in Retrospect', in Samantha Besson, Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, 
and Samuel Jube (eds), Comparing Comparative Law (2017), 19 ff, 29. 
30 See, e.g., Moller (n l); Landman (n l); Alston (n 1). 
31 See, e.g., Eva Brems and Ellen Desmet (eds), Integrated Human Rights in Practice: Rewriting Human 
Rights Decisions (2017); Carla Buckley, Alice Donald, and Philip Leach (eds), Towards Convergence in 
International Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems (2016). 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1229 
most publications in comparative international human rights law to date have focused, and 
relied, on the premise of the fragmentation into different universal and regional regimes. 32 
While this is an important issue, the respective authors reduce the role of comparative 
international human rights law to die identification of necessarily problematic discrepancies 
in human rights' interpretations among those regimes and to the search for their 'integra-
tion'. As I will argue, different domestic, regional, and universal interpretations of human 
rights' duties can not only be justified but are actually called for, depending on the circum-
stances and the relevant threats to the interests protected by those rights. Thus, to the extent 
that human rights comparison may identify a transnational consensus on the regional or 
universal plane, that consensus corresponds neither to a pre-existing coherent 'whole'33 
to be uncovered and reinstated nor to an emerging whole to be constituted through active 
harmonization and at any price. 
The diird kind of CHRL is comparative international-domestic human rights law. 34 It amounts 
to the horizontal comparison of the influence of international human rights law in domestic 
law. Unlike comparative domestic human rights law, it encompasses international human 
rights law, and unlike comparative international human rights law, it looks at international 
human rights law in domestic law. 
Comparative international-domestic human rights law should have emerged with the 
development of international human rights law monitoring of domestic law by international 
bodies in the 1990s. 35 Yet, it is only recently, and in the wake of the emergence of compara-
tive international law, that publications in comparative international-domestic human rights 
law have started to appear. Before the emergence of comparative international-domestic 
human rights law, most studies in international human rights law focused on the structure 
and the content of international human rights, with the rare inclusion of some compliance 
aspects, and then only as a top-down and non-comparative issue and from a purely inter-
national point of view.36 Interestingly, while comparative international-domestic human 
rights law studies have become more common lately on a regional plane, either with regard 
to a specific regional human rights instrument37 or between them, 38 they are still much 
rarer with respect to universal human rights instruments. 39 
32 See, e.g., Eva Brems, 'Should Pluriform Human Rights Become One?-Exploring the Benefits of 
Human Rights Integration/Integrer le droit des droits de l'homme: une exploration', [2014] Journal 
europeen des droits de l'homme/European Journal of Human Rights 447 ff. 
33 See Eva Brems, 'We Need to Look at International Human Rights Law (Also) as a Whole', 15 October 
2014. Available at <https://www.ejiltalk.org/we-need-to-look-at-international-human-rights-law-also-
as-a-whole/>. See, however, Eva Brems, 'Smart Human Rights Integration', in Eva Brems and Salla Ouad 
Chaib (eds), Fragmentation and Integration in International Human Rights Law (2018), 165- 194. 
34 See, e.g., Venice Commission, Report on the Implementation of International Human Rights Treaties 
in Domestic Law and the Role of Courts (2014); Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of 
Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (2008); Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, The 
Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level (2002). 
35 See, however, Alston (n 1), v. 
36 See, e.g., Benedetto Conforti and Francesco Francioni (eds), Enforcing International Human Rights 
in Domestic Courts (1997). 
37 See, e.g., Keller and Stone Sweet (n 34). 38 See, e.g., Neuman (n 14). 
39 See, however, McCrudden, 'Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties?' (n 7), 
549; McCrudden, 'CEDAW in National Courts' (n 7); Samantha Besson, 'The Influence of the UN 
Covenants in States Parties across Regions-Some Lessons for the Role of Comparative Law and Regions 
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Conversely, to this date, studies in comparative domestic human rights law have rarely 
compared the influence of international human rights law in domestic law. 40 They have 
done so only when international human rights law has been incorporated and turned into 
domestic human rights law,41 on the one hand, and only with respect to the institutional 
and structural features of domestic human rights law that result from international human 
rights law requirements (e.g. judicial review), on the other. The first reason for this neglect 
may be that many accounts of comparative domestic human rights law do not approach 
human rights comparison and its outcome as binding, or, at least, do not include in the 
scope of their comparison human rights norms that actually bind foreign authorities as 
much as domestic ones, such as international human rights law. A second explanation may 
be the opposition perceived between domestic human rights law qua constitutional rights 
and international human rights law qua human rights, and their lack of comparability as 
a result. While it is true that domestic human rights law may ensure a higher level of 
protection of the rights protected under international human rights law as well as protect 
additional ones, most of the rights protected under domestic human rights law correspond 
to those included as a set of minima by international legal human rights and are in a rela-
tionship of complementarity with them. 42 It is actually that complementary overlap between 
domestic and international human rights law that is of interest to this chapter and that is, 
I will argue, comparative in nature. 43 
The emergence of comparative international-domestic human rights law thus reveals 
that the comparison of domestic human rights law is difficult to disentangle from the 
comparison of the influence of international human 'fights law in domestic law and 
that, given the relationship between domestic and international human rights law in 
domestic law, the former somehow necessarily includes the latter. What this means is 
that comparative international-domestic human rights law is best approached as a part 
of comparative domestic human rights law. Since comparative international human rights 
law is a necessary part of comparative international-domestic human rights law to the 
extent that international human rights law always comes with its plurality of instru-
ments and bodies, all three contemporary kinds of CBRL are intimately connected to 
one another. 
Of course, contemporary studies in CBRL do not necessarily practice all three, or, at 
least, do not always realize or claim that they do, and thus do not organize their comparative 
research in that way. It is my claim, however, that they should do so, and that CBRL lato 
sensu is best approached as this single, albeit multidimensional, mosaic of comparative 
domestic human rights law, comparative international human rights law and comparative 
international-domestic human rights law. Not practising CBRL in this multidimensional 
fashion leads to an impoverished account of the practice of human rights law either 
in International Human Rights Law: in Daniel Moeckli and Helen Keller (eds), The UN Human Rights 
Covenants at 50 (2018), 243-76. 
40 See, e.g., Bobek (n 2), 34; Groppi and Ponthoreau (n 2), 4-5. 
41 See, e.g., Law and Versteeg (n 7), 1189. 
42 See Neuman (n 9); Besson (n 9); Besson (n 10); Samantha Besson, 'The Sources of International 
Human Rights Law: in Samantha Besson and Jean d'Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the 
Sources of International Law (2017), 837 ff. 
43 See Besson (n 9); Besson (n 10). See also Waldron (n 2), 120-3. 
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domestically or internationally. As I will argue, it thus fails to contribute fully to the com-
parative and transnational project of international human rights law-making. 
III. THE METHODS OF COMPARATIVE 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Methodological debates in comparative law are blooming. Such debates usually revolve 
around the discipline's aims,44 objects, subjects, and methods. For reasons of scope, this 
section focuses on the methods of CBRL stricto sensu. It starts by explaining how the 
transnational consensus method works (Section III.i), before turning to how it relates to 
some of the general methods of comparative law (Section III.2). 
i. Comparative Human Rights Law and the Transnational 
Consensus Method 
Regrettably, the practice of CBRL is largely irregular with respect to method. 45 International 
human rights institutions often lack the necessary resources and time to devote themselves 
rigorously to comparative investigations. Domestic institutions are even less consistent in 
this respect. 
The one notable regional exception is the comparative practice leading to the identifica-
tion of the transnational or 'European consensus' observable both in the ECtHR's case-law46 
and in the practice of domestic courts and institutions relative to the ECHR. 
The 'European consensus' in the ECtBR's case law corresponds to a form of subsequent 
State practice or interpretative custom of the ECHR developed among States parties and iden-
tified by the Court.47 It is based on European States' general practice (the latter need not be 
unanimous48), on the one hand, and their opinio juris (mostly attested by domestic judicial 
interpretations), on the other. The two constitutive elements of the consensus are verified by 
reference to various legal materials: some domestic (e.g. domestic legislation or judicial deci-
sions) and some international (e.g. other international human rights treaties or norms and 
44 See McCrudden (n 5), 516-27; Waldron (n 2), 114-7, 411, 418, 420 ff. 
4 5 See McCrudden (n 5), 510 ff. 
46 See, e.g., Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Vasily Lukashevich, 'Informed Decision-Making: The 
Comparative Endeavours of the Strasbourg Court; (2012) 30:3 Netherlands Human Rights Quarterly 272 
ff; Christopher McCrudden, 'Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication: The Court 
of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights Compared; (2013) Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 15, 383 ff. On the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' transnational 
'consensus' method, see Neuman (n 14). 
47 See Ineta Ziemele, 'Customary International Law in the Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights: in Council of Europe (ed), The fudge and International Custom (2013), 75 ff. For a full argument 
for the customary nature of some international human rights, see Besson (n 42). 
48 See Luzius Wildhaber, Arnaldur Hjartarson, and Stephen Donnelly, 'No Consensus on Consensus-
The Practice of the European Court of Human Rights: (2013) Human Rights LJ 33, 248 ff. 
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their interpretations by their respective international organs); some soft and some hard; some 
internal to some or all the States parties to the ECHR and some external to that group.49 
The reference to international human rights law practice external to that of European 
States Parties or, at least, to those at stake in a given case, and hence to international human 
rights law that does not bind them, has been contested. Yet, the Court has confirmed the 
universal scope of its comparative practice. 50 What matters, it has stressed, is that the rele-
vant evidence 'denote[s] a continuous evolution in the norms and principles applied in 
international law or in the domestic law of the majority of member States of the Council of 
Europe and show, in a precise area, that there is common ground in modern societies'51 • 
That transnational human rights consensus constrains the Court's dynamic interpretation 
of the ECHR and guides it, for it substantiates the subsequent treaty practice of States as 
required by the international law of treaties (Art 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. 
Of course, even the ECtHR's practice concerning the human rights consetisus remains 
largely unpredictable. Thus, scholars have wondered about how general and regular the 
transnational practice should be before it can amount to consensus. There is nothing 
unusual here, however, if one considers the indeterminacy of the criteria used for the iden-
tification of customary international law in the practice of both domestic and international 
institutions. As a matter of fact, a lot of the academic criticism may also be directed against 
other largely indeterminate features of legal, and especially judicial, reasoning. Consider, 
for example, debates about the process of judicial 'interpretation' or 'precedents: There are 
ways, moreover, for the ECtHR's approach to transnational consensus to be streamlined and 
generalized as a method in CHRL. 52 
2. Comparative Human Rights Law and the General 
Methods of Comparative Law 
It is interesting to assess how the method of CHRL so described relates to some of the 
general approaches to, and methods of, comparative law. In a nutshell, those are:53 (moral 
and legal) universalism and the search for pre-existing commonality (i); functionalism, 
and the organization of transplants; (ii) factualism, and the attempt to identify common 
cores; (iii); and differentialism, ie the celebration of diversity (iv). 
Unlike other comparative constitutional law contexts, where comparison may lead to 
the conclusion of either difference or similarity depending on how convergent domestic 
constitutional practices are, human rights comparison as a central part of the human rights' 
common project contributes to the identification of common transnational ground in the 
49 See ECtHR, Demir and Baykara v Turkey, App no 34503/97, 12 November 2008, paras 85-6; ECtHR, 
Case of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, App no 
31045/10, 8 April 2014, paras 76, 98. 
50 See ECtHR, Case of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (n 49 ), paras 76, 98. 
51 See ECtHR, Demir and Baykara (n 49), para 85: 'can and must'. 
52 See, e.g., Besson (n 10); Besson (n 39); Waldron (n 2), 173-4, 187 ff. 
53 See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, 'Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation', (1999) 74 Indiana LJ 3, 819 ff, 825. 
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domestic and international human rights practice. Indeed, it starts from the premise that 
there could and should be some commonality between domestic and international human 
rights' interpretations and, when there is, it seeks to identify that human rights' consensus 
across the various interpretations compared. The minimal common ground so identified 
may, provided it is validated by international human rights law and institutions, become 
entrenched as a minimal international human rights standard that can bind domestic 
authorities in return and be submitted to their further interpretation and practice. 
Importantly, however, that human rights' common ground does not pre-exist comparison, 
and it does not amount to a minimum (moral or natural law) content54 or common denom-
inator awaiting to be discovered or recognized. 55 Provided it is identified by comparison, it 
should first be constructed and consolidated and then stand to be re-consolidated again, or 
not, through the next comparisons and distinctions in domestic and international human 
rights practice. 
To that extent, CHRL should not be associated with the universalist project in comparative 
law (i). When comparative law theories, resting on a form of moral universalism, claim that 
comparative law, and CHRL in particular, help identifying the (moral) 'common core' of 
human rights,56 they simply miss the point of CHRL.57 
At the same time, however, human rights' reasoning is not a matter of harmonization 
based on that consensus once it has been identified, or even of irresistible uniformization 
either, but of engaging in a common project of comparison and distinction. 58 Human rights, 
while being universal in one way, also need to be specified in each political and legal context 
in order to become most effective. They are thus universal and particular at the same time. 
Their universal guarantees in international human rights law have to be open to different 
domestic and regional interpretations. Human rights comparison should therefore be 
approached as a dynamic process, and not as a static outcome, 59 ie as a constant negotiation 
between the universal and the particular. 
Thus, CHRL should not be associated with the functionalist organization oflegal transplants 
from one domestic legal order to the other (ii), or with the factualist search for common 
cores (iii) . 'Legal transplant' theories, including their IKEA variations,60 miss the point of 
CHRL. Human rights have to be home-grown to be effective in the protection against spe-
cific threats and for the specification of the corresponding duties. If there is a transplant 
from CHRL, it is only the transplant of a human rights minimum consolidated from the 
54 See, e.g., Alford (n 11), 659. Contra: Perju (n 19), 180; Waldron (n 2), 40-3. 
55 Importantly, for many authors writing in the seventeenth century already, jus gentium was not to be 
identified by 'finding' some pre-existing rational or moral commonality, but by observing legal commonal-
ities developed by accretion. See e.g. on the notion of 'common sense' (senso commune) underpinningjus 
gentium: Giambattista Vico, The New Science (3rd edn, 1744, English translation by Dave Marsh, 2000), 
paras 46 and 311; Alain Pons, Vie et mort des Nations: Lecture de la Science nouvelle de Giambattista Vico 
(2015), 78-9, 82 and 131 ff. 
56 See, e.g. Alison Dundes Renteln, 'Relativism and the Search for Human Rights: (1988) 90 American 
Anthropologist 1, 56 ff. 
57 To that extent, Gunter Frankenberg, Comparative Law as Critique (2016), Ch 6's critique of CHRL 
is misguided. 
58 See also Waldron (n 4); Waldron (n 2); McCrudden (n 5). 59 See Waldron (n 2), 214-21. 
60 See Ralf Michaels, "'One Size Can Fit All" -Some Heretical Thoughts on Mass Production of Legal 
Transplants: in Gunter Frankenberg (ed), Order from Transfer: Comparative Constitutional Design and 
Legal Culture (2013), 56 ff. 
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transnational human rights consensus and turned into abstract standards of international 
human rights law and hence of an international minimum that is to be specified anew 
domestically. 
All the same, human rights law is a common enterprise we share universally, and this 
common enterprise has given rise to international human rights law. As a result, we may 
also assume that there can and should be commonalities to be identified and to consolidate 
along the way. 61 To that extent, CHRL should not be conflated with a purely differentialist 
celebration of domestic legal cultures (iv). 1 
IV. THE LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY OF 
COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Difficult normative questions arise concerning the existence and nature of CHRLs authority 
or claim to bind actors qua source of law (Section IV1); the justifications thereof, ie the 
legitimacy of CHRL (Section IV2); and how to respond to the objection of its lack of demo-
cratic legitimacy (Section IV3). 
i. The Authority of Comparative Human Rights Law 
Obviously, the mere fact that a given human rights practice is common somewhere does 
not make it a binding norm. It is not because most countries do practice human rights law 
in a certain way that others should do so as well. Thus an account of the authority of CHRL 
needs to explain how one can get from the is of the identification of a transnational human 
rights consensus to the ought of the duty to abide by it. This requires clarifying the inherent 
normativity or bindingness of CHRL qua source of law, ie its ability to give us objective 
reasons for compliance. The legal authority of CHRL as practical authority should be distin-
guished from its theoretical authority, ie its ability to give use reasons to believe -although 
the latter may exist independently. Another important delineation contrasts the objective 
reasons for action at stake in CHRLs legal authority with the competing prudential reasons 
to abide by the outcome of CHRL (e.g. comity, reciprocity). 
As I explained before, comparative law is usually approached not only as a legal method, 
but also as a source of law. 62 Of course, this does not mean that it should be understood as 
a distinct legal order. On the contrary, like customary law or general principles, and maybe 
even qua either or all of them, CHRL may be considered a source of law that belongs to 
different legal orders at the same time, both domestic and international. 
Establishing the legal authority of CHRL as a source of law requires explaining how it 
can have legal authority without amounting to an ordinary set of legal rules. For this to 
succeed, one should provide an argument for alternative types of legal authority beyond 
61 See also Waldron (n 4); Jeremy Waldron, 'How to Argue for a Universal Claim', (1999) 30 Columbia 
Human Rights LR 2, 305 ff. 
62 See Waldron (n 2), 56-9, 67-75. 
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the exclusionary or peremptory way in which the authority of law is usually thought to be 
exercized. Indeed, the authority of law is traditionally defined as giving rise to duties to 
abide by law to the exclusion of any other reason that may pull in the opposite direction.63 
Following Waldron,64 we need to consider other forms oflegal authority than the usual 
peremptory kind. The main example thereof is the authority of judicial precedent that binds 
and has a normative impact on judicial reasoning to the extent that precedents have to be 
respected, but do not necessarily exclude or supersede other reasons since precedents may 
be overruled or distinguished. Precedents do not bind as legal rules, therefore, even though 
they constrain legal reasoning and give rise to legal duties. On that basis, one could approach 
CHRL, and the transnational consensus it may help identifying, as a binding transnational 
precedent.65 Importantly, this does not preclude the authority of transnational precedents 
of a non-judicial kind. 
This kind of alternative and non-peremptory legal authority is sometimes referred to as 
'persuasive: as in the 'persuasive authority' of foreign law or foreign precedents. The problem 
with this qualification is that it has been used with very different normative implications 
and can mean almost anything today. Sometimes, persuasive authority is opposed to binding 
authority. Others use persuasiveness to refer to the force of the reasoning of the legal decision 
(giving rise to content-dependent reasons) as opposed to its bindingness by the mere fact 
of being law (giving rise to content-independent reasons).66 A third group of authors use 
the adjective 'persuasive' to refer to binding and content-independent authority, but non-
peremptory authority. This is the way it is used by Waldron in particular.67 It corres.pon~s 
to the alternative and more moderate kind of legal authority proposed for CHRL m this 
chapter, although the term 'persuasive' will not be used. 
2. The Justifications for the Authority of Comparative 
Human Rights Law 
The justification for the authority of CHRL, ie its legitimacy, amounts to moral reasons to 
abide by it because it is law. . 
First, qua legal authority, it should be distinguished from the independent moral authority 
of the content of the transnational human rights consensus that depends on its moral truth 
or correctness, and not on the existence of a transnational consensus in the legal practice of 
human rights. This is an important distinction to make in order to avoid another related 
confusion between the moral justification of human rights qua moral rights (e.g. their 
potential grounding in a plurality of interests or in dignity) and the legitimacy of human 
rights law, ie the moral justification of the legal authority of CHRL. 
Second, the legitimate authority of CHRL needs to be established morally. This goes 
beyond the observation of the existence of legal reasons that human rights law itself may 
give to resort to CHRL. Of course, there are legal duties (though they are rare) to resort to 
63 See Joseph Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms (1999), 44 ff. 
64 See Waldron (n 2), 61- 2, 193, 221-3. 
65 See also McCrudden (n 5), 516 ff. 66 See Markesinis and Fedtke (n 19). 
67 See Waldron (n 2), 21, 61- 2, 84. See also Frederick Schauer, 'Authority and Authorities', (2008) 94:8 
Virginia LR 1931 ff, 1940-52. 
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CHRL and to abide by it in domestic human rights law (e.g. Art 39(1) of the South African 
Constitution) or in international human rights law (e.g. Art 60 of the African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights). One may also mention the Preamble of the (non-binding) 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) emphasizing that 'a common understand-
ing of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance' for their full realization. The 
mere fact that domestic human rights law and international human rights law entail such 
legal duties to resort to CHRL is telling, but does not, however, settle the issue of their 
justification. 
Importantly, the ground or justifications for the legal authority of CHRL have to be 
objective. Its legitimacy should be distinguished therefore from subjective legitimacy based 
on acceptance or consent. In any case, the question of the authority of CHRL only matters 
if one disagrees with it. Thus, the reference to human rights 'consensus' should not be con-
flated with the idea of an agreement over a certain human rights conception or consent to 
it-not even, as I explained before, among the states or institutions that share tliat common 
ground. What matters is that there is sufficient convergence among states practising human 
rights law for a state not yet complying with such a converging interpretation to be bound. 
Thus, the proposed grounds of legitimacy of CHRL should be clearly distinguished from 
(state) consent and from consensualism in legitimacy theories. 
There are two main justifications for the authority of CHRL and of the transnational 
consensus it may identify on any given human rights issue: an egalitarian and hence demo-
cratic justification, and a reflexive social-moral epistemic one (Section IV1(b)). Those grounds 
for the legitimacy of CHRL as the main method of ascertainment of human rights law will 
appear more clearly once the duality of the domestic-international legal regime of human 
rights law is fully understood and its own authority is justified (Section IV1(a)).68 
(a) The Justified Authority of Transnational Human Rights Law 
Historically, domestic human rights law and international human rights law co-developed in 
such a way tliat the minimal common or transnational ground tliat gradually consolidated 
across States' respective domestic human rights practice was mutually reinforced and turned 
into an international minimal human rights standard. That international human rights stand-
ard now constrains tlie domestic human rights practice of states in return, but, importantly, 
develops further on tlie basis of states' transnational practice as soon as tlie latter is sufficiently 
general to have matured and consolidated into a transnational common ground. 69 
As a result, the minimal content of international human rights law evolves together 
with that of their transnational domestic practice. This usually implies a levelling-up of 
the international minimal human rights standard, but one cannot exclude some degree of 
levelling-down in case of widespread reasonable disagreement. Of course, levelling-down is 
made harder by the codification of the transnational minimal human rights standard into 
international human rights law: since that standard requires the same level of transnational 
commonality of the new interpretation to evolve one way or the other, levelling-down is 
68 Note that I am not considering other competing instrumental or even inherent grounds for the 
legitimate authority of international human rights law in general (including non-democratic and non-
epistemic ones), but am focusing only on the legitimacy of transnational human rights law and of CHRL 
therein. See also Besson (n 9); Besson (n 10). 
69 See Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), 337-8. 
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rare in practice. Some absolute limits of minimal equality and non-discrimination are 
also entrenched in international human rights law which must be respected even in case of 
levelling-down. 
One may wonder about the justification of the authority of transnational human rights 
law in practice. Prima facie, indeed, international law has the kind of universal material 
scope that matches that of universal moral rights and hence the scope of the common 
project to protect human rights legally. Therefore, it would seem to provide the privileged 
order for the legal protection of human rights given that international human rights law 
claims to bind all states and since its authority, provided it could be justified, could be 
justified universally. 
The primary justification for the transnational legality of human rights, however, lies in 
its egalitarian and hence democratic dimension. 
As I have argued elsewhere, human rights are constitutive of our equal basic moral sta-
tus. 70 Accordingly, the process through which their recognition and specification take 
place ought to be egalitarian and public, and include all those whose rights are affected 
and whose equality is at stake. What this means is that human rights should be recognized 
and specified as equal rights through a procedure that guarantees their public equality, that 
is to say a democratic procedure. 
At first sight, this egalitarian and democratic argument seems to speak in favour of domestic 
human rights protection and against protecting human rights through international law at 
all.7 1 At the same time, of course, certain minimal egalitarian conditions have to be met for 
the domestic recognition and specification of human rights to be democratic. These 
minimal conditions of public equality should be guaranteed externally by international law 
and tlius constrain tlie domestic polity. This is tlie point at which international human rights 
law, and the minimal democratic guarantees it constitutes, come into the picture. However, 
for these minimal democratic and human rights constraints in international law to be 
democratically legitimate in the first place, they should draw on the transnational common 
ground shared by the practice of States that regard each other as democratic. Importantly, 
they need not have (yet) been protected as rights to be recognized by international human 
rights law, but only substantially realized so as to constitute a minimal common ground 
among democratic States. 
This is how, as I have argued elsewhere, human rights and democracy have been 
de-coupled and then re-coupled again since 1945 through the combination of domestic 
and international human rights law. This is also why it would be wrong to oppose domestic 
democracy to international human rights law: both human rights and democracy are 
protected by international human rights law complementing domestic human rights 
and democracy law thanks to its transnational law-making process.72 To that extent, the 
70 See Samantha Besson, 'The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights', [2012] Archiv fur Sozial- und 
Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft 136, 19 ff. 
7 1 See Samantha Besson, 'Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context-Decoupling and 
Recoupling', (2011) 4 Ethics and Global Politics 1, 19 ff. 
72 See Besson (n 10). Scope precludes providing a full argument here for the moral co-originality and 
complementarity of human rights and democracy in protecting our equal moral status, and the corres-
ponding complementarity of individual rights and the democratic principle in international human n ghts 
law according to which neither of them may take priority over the other, but for the basic guarantees of 
our equal moral status in so-called core rights and duties and non-discrimination rights. 
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recognition and development of international human rights law truly amount to a common 
project among democratic states. 
There is a second justification for the authority of transnational human rights law: an 
epistemic one. Given the concrete nature of human rights duties, their existence and content 
can only be identified in domestic circumstances. Human rights being equal rights, this is 
indeed the socio-comparative context in which the general threats to the interest protected 
by a given human right can be assessed and the potential corresponding duties identified.73 
Again, however, this requires that some minimal epistemic conditions be respected. These 
conditions are best imposed from the outside through international human rights law. 
However, this should be done in a way that starts from the epistemic conditions tried out 
previously in domestic circumstances, albeit on a larger and t;ansnational scale, ie in the 
context of the original recognition of the rights that have become international human rights 
law and the determination of the corresponding duties. Of course, as before, once these 
minimal epistemic conditions are entrenched internationally, only the practice of the states 
embodying them shall be considered for the further interpretation and development of 
international human rights law, with a view to considering their new common interpretations 
as part of the international standard. 
This approach to human rights relies on a moral epistemology that is social, and even 
socio-political given how human rights are constitutive of our public status as equals. Because 
our social context may also distort our beliefs about rights, the epistemic conditions tried 
out previously in domestic circumstances where human rights have developed should be 
those where those rights are already substantively realized. This is what Allen Buchanan has 
described as the 'reflexive' dimension of the moral epistemology of human rights. 74 
(b) The Justified Authority of Human Rights Comparison 
The transnationality of human rights law so identified and justified has direct implications 
for how we should understand its sources, both domestic an& international, that is to say 
the way human rights law is made and specified in practice. 
As a matter of fact, one methodological feature common to most sources of domestic 
and international human rights law, and the way in which they are interpreted, is that they 
all use some form of transnational human rights comparison. This may lead, in some cases, 
to the finding that there is a transnational human rights consensus. While international 
human rights institutions that identify a transnational human rights consensus may validate 
it as international human rights law, domestic human rights institutions also contribute, 
through their own human rights comparisons, to consolidating and 'boilerplating' that con-
sensus before it is confirmed by an international institution and entrenched in international 
human rights law. 
If CHRL has legitimate authority in both domestic and international human rights law, 
it is because human rights law is justified in claiming transnational and hence universal 
authority for the common ground shared across various domestic practices, a common 
ground CHRL helps identifying and constituting. 
73 See, e.g., ECtHR, S.A.S. v France, App no 43835/11, 1 July 2014, para 129. 
74 See Allen Buchanan, 'The Reflexive Social Moral Epistemology of Human Rights: in Miranda 
Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt (eds), The Routledge Handbook 
of Social Epistemology (2019) (forthcoming). 
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Echoing the justifications of the authority of transnational human rights law discussed in 
the previous section, the first justification for the authority of CHRL is democratic. CHRL 
provides the best way to grasp what is common in democratic states' transnational human 
rights practice and to entrench and protect it internationally. Human rights comparison 
thereby contributes to the democratic justification of the authority of international human 
rights law as well as to that of domestic human rights law, and may be considered as justified 
on those grounds.75 
Importantly, the relevant unit for this democratic comparative assessment is no longer the 
domestic system but a transnational deliberative and practising community of democratic 
states(peoples).76 To that extent, the proposed egalitarian and democratic justification of 
CHRL overcomes the 'single agency' problem Waldron faces in his integrity-based argument 
for CHRL:77 it need not strip the community of human rights comparators from their 
respective political institutions, ie their States and domestic democratic institutions. 
Another justification for the authority of CHRL is epistemic. Based on the proposed 
reflexive social-moral epistemology of human rights,78 one may consider that the compari-
son of other domestic and international human rights practice is the best way to determine 
what human rights are. Because our beliefs may be distorted by our parochial social prac-
tises, it is important that human rights reasoning be comparative and include interpretations 
from other domestic and international human rights law and institutions that share the 
same epistemic premises. 
Indeed, one can argue that, contrary to what authors usually claim, 79 CHRL actually 
amounts to a way of preventing parochial conceptions from being too quickly entrenched 
into international human rights law and without transnational disagreement and contestation, 
and hence to protecting the claimed universality of human rights from parochialism. Starting 
from many distinct domestic human rights' interpretations and comparing them on a 
transnational scale in order to identify a common ground contributes to questioning the 
future international human rights standard and hence to making it less parochial. Importantly, 
human rights comparison is pluralist and does not suppress reasonable disagreement. On 
the contrary, it favours experimentation and strengthens deliberation.80 Accordingly, it 
reflects and even contributes to the constant passage from the universal to the particular 
and back again. 
Importantly, this epistemic argument for transnational human rights law does not mean 
that human rights should be regarded as 'self-certifying'. It is not because we regard a par-
ticular transnational practice as amounting to the realization of transnational human rights 
law that should be entrenched as a minimum international standard that that practice 
necessarily corresponds to the (however pluralistic) universal moral truth or, later on, that 
it captures one of its (however multi-faceted) correct moral interpretations. We may be 
75 Even Waldron (n 2), 134- 5, 196-8, seems to concede as much when he limits the scope of the 
transnational human rights consensus to that between 'free and democratic' states. 
76 See also the UDHR Preamble: 'Whereas [ ... ] the advent of a world in which human beings shall 
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people' (emphasis added). 
77 See Waldron (n 2), 130-5; Waldron (n 5). 78 See Buchanan (n 74). 
79 See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, 'Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards: (1999) 31 
New York University Journal of International Law 4, 843 ff. 
80 See Waldron (n 2), 214- 21. 
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entirely wrong about them and should be ready to correct ourselves. However, it is likely 
that we will be able better to ascertain what human rights are after having reasoned and 
compared human rights on a transnational scale, than doing so alone, on either the domestic 
or the international plane.81 
Importantly, tlie proposed democratic and epistemic justifications of the authority of 
CHRL, and of the corresponding transnational human rights consensus, should be distin-
guished from other justifications that have or could potentially be advanced by human 
rights comparatists in the same universalist vein. The key to making those distinctions lies 
in separating the moral from the legal meanings of the 'universality' of human rights. 
First, the proposed account of the legitimate authority of CHRL should not be con -
flated with justifications that derive from the moral universality and universal moral 
justification(s) of human rights. According to such arguments, what justifies the authority 
of the transnational human rights consensus is that it matches the universal moral rights 
underpinning international human rights law and domestic human rights law and that it 
draws on their universal moral justification(s). 
The first difficulty with this kind of justifications is, as I explained before, that, in circum-
stances of pervasive and persistent reasonable disagreement, the existence of a transnational 
consensus, whether regional or even universal, is no guarantee that we got the universal 
moral justification right. It suffices here to think of the transnational consensus that long 
prevailed about the inequality between men and women. The second difficulty is that this 
kind of arguments is missing tlie target: what justifies tlie authority of CHRL qua law cannot 
be the moral justification of its content for that would make its legal authority redundant. 
Of course, someone may object that the best moral justification of uni"rersal human rights 
actually amounts to some sort of overlapping consensus. Again, while this could provide a 
justification of moral human rights in human rights theory (even though I do not think it 
can), it could not justify the authority of human rights law as law. In short, the justification 
of the authority of CHRL is not about getting to the universal moral truth about human 
rights, even if the latter exists and matters independently. 82 
Second, the proposed justifications of the authority of CHRL differ from justifications 
that rely on the legal universality of international human rights law. According to such 
arguments, the justification for CHRL is the greater harmonization of domestic human rights 
law that is allegedly required by the universality of international human rights law. 
While it is correct that international human rights law claims to bind universally, it is 
wrong to derive a duty to harmonize or even unify human rights law on the universal plane 
from the universal human rights duties arising from international human rights law. As 
I explained before, human rights duties may only be specified in the context of a political 
(and democratic) community, and to that extent, international human rights law can only 
be minimal. Of course, one may reply that the minimalist interpretations of human rights 
consolidated as international human rights law should themselves be harmonized univer-
sally and tliat CHRL contributes to tliat effort. While tliat is right, we will not know what that 
minimum amounts to before we have identified a common ground tlirough the transnational 
81 On moral supervenience and resorting to socio-comparative evidence of what makes us equal (and 
that, on this chapter's understanding, accounts for our human rights), see also Jeremy Waldron, One 
Another's Equals: The Basis of Human Equality (2017), 135 ff. 
82 See also Waldron (n 2), 117-20; McCrudden (n 5), 528. 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1241 
consensus of CHRL. That common ground does not pre-exist human rights compa~ison, 
and assuming there is or should be such a common ground, may ~e counter-p~oductive to 
human rights protection. In short, the justification for the authonty of CHRL is not about 
completing the universal harmonization of international human rights law. 
3. The Democratic Objection to the Legitimacy 
of Comparative Human Rights Law 
Ironically, one of the most serious critiques usually put fo~war~ . against th~ legitimac~ of 
CHRL is democratic. It is often argued that using human nghts mterpretat10ns stemm1~g 
from foreign, albeit democratic, jurisdictions amounts to a violation of the democratic 
principle. 83 . . • . . 
To start with, this objection should not be conflated with the related cntique to JUd1Clal 
review that may also apply to the use of foreign precedents by.domestic j~~~es. I am assum-
ing that the latter may be addressed on deliberative democratic grounds, m order to focus 
only on the objection pertaining to the democratic legitimacy of CHRL qua l~w. 
The difficulty raised by the democratic objection is that, ~o quote Waldr~~; law do~s not 
become democratic here because it was enacted democratically elsewhere. Accordmg to 
him, even if 'the modern jus gentium should be focused on legal cons~ns~s ~mong d~mo,~: 
racies, that is not the same as the consensus having democratic credentials m 1ts ~wn ngh~. 
In reply, one should start by clarifying that the argument made in the prev10us sect10.n 
was not an argument for a transnational political community, even less so for a democratic 
one. Just as the transnational human rights consensus, and the common law that cor~esponds 
to it, do not amount to a distinct and third legal order besides domestic huma~ :1ghts law 
and international human rights law, the community of democratic commumties wh~se 
human rights' interpretations are compared does not constitute a third political commumty 
besides domestic states(peoples) and the international community of stateS.87 It amounts 
rather to a transnational epistemic and deliberative community of democratic state~(~eoples) 
straddling all communities. The important point, however, is that those commumties prac-
tice a common standard of human rights and therefore of democracy under i~ternational 
human rights law. 88 It is no longer reasonable to conceive of domestic democratic standards 
(of which human rights are a part) in isolation and with~ut refere~ce to the common 
democratic standards consolidated as international human nghts law m the context of our 
common democratic project. This explains in turn why tlie consent of each democratic State 
that may usually be invoked as an exception to the legitimacy of international law may n~t 
be invoked as such against the legitimacy of CHRL. Not only does the object of ~emocratic 
state consent need to be deliberated to remain democratically legitimate, and this c~n only 
be done through transnational channels, but that deliberation is inherently constramed by 
83 See on this critique: McCrudden (n 5), 501 ff, 529 ff; Waldron, 'Rights and the Citation of Foreign 
Law' (n 6) 412 ff; Waldron (n 2), 142 ff. 
84 See, 'e.g., Jeremy Waldron, 'Judges as Moral Reasoners: (2009) 7:1 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2 ff; Waldron (n 2), 143-55. 
85 See Waldron (n 2), 197. 86 See idem, 153. 87 See idem, 126-35, 133. 
88 For a similar, albeit non-democratic argument, see idem, 131-5. 
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the corresponding minimal democratic standards of international human rights law whose 
interpretation is at stake in CHRL. 
To that extent, the respective democratic legitimacies of domestic human rights 
interpretations may not be contrasted in the way one may contrast the democratic legitimacy 
of a domestic legal interpretation with that of an international institution or court's abiding 
by different principles of legitimacy. Their respective standards for what a democratic pro-
cedure and decision amount to are already mutualized and deeply interconnected through 
the codification of international human rights law and the constantly renewed consolidation 
of democratic standards in its interpretation. 
Of course, it is important to remember that the legal authority of CHRL is not of the 
main and peremptory kind that is usually thought to apply to domestic or international 
legal rules. CHRL is binding, but in a way that may not be decisive. 89 The reasons it gives 
may therefore have to be weighed against other reasons, including democratic domestic 
ones, in the judge's or any other domestic authority's reasoning. At this stage, someone may 
object to this plurality oflegal authorities. It is important to remember, however, that this is 
already the way constitutional adjudication works today, with perefnptory rules, judicial 
precedents and content-dependent reasons all applying in concert. 
As a rejoinder, the proponents of the democratic objection may stress that not all States 
are democratic, and that this jeopardizes the proposed democratic argument for the 
legitimacy of the transnational consensus in human rights law. It is a consequence of 
the proposed argument, however, that non-democratic States should not be allowed to con-
tribute to the further transnational development of the minimal international human rights 
standard that also amounts to a minimal democratic standard constraining democratic states. 
Non-democratic states' human rights interpretations should not belong to the material 
compared and the consolidation of the transnational human rights consensus. 90 Of course, 
non-democratic States should be encouraged to become democratic and actually ought to, 
just as they are encouraged to protect human rights and actually ought to abide by them. 
Being entitled to participate in the human rights comparison project and the elaboration 
of the transnational consensus on those rights only once they have achieved respect for 
the minimal democratic standards entrenched in international human rights law should 
amount to an effective incentive to that effect. It is actually also a responsibility of other 
states under international human rights law (e.g. under international human rights' treaties' 
responsibilities of cooperation with other states) to make sure non-democratic States 
abide by their human rights duties and the minimal democratic standards entrenched in 
international human rights law. r 
True, defining what a 'democratic State' actually means may lead us into the kind of 
'Charybdis and Scylla' situation Waldron has in mind with respect to his own account's 
requirement of 'civilization'.91 This difficulty may not be as great as expected, however. 
Indeed, the common human rights project has already led to the consolidation of common 
democratic standards in international human rights law over time, and we may, as a result, 
refer to those as a guide of what a 'democratic State' and democratic procedures amount to. 92 
89 See also Waldron (n 2), 208- 9. 
:: See also Waldron (n 2), 196-8. See, e.g, ECtHR, A. v Norway, App no 28070/06, 9 April 2009, para 74. 
See Waldron (n 2), 193. 
92 See, e.g., ECtHR, Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom, App. no 48876/08, 22 April 
2013, paras 115- 16. 
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The kind of human rights comparison required by the human rights project is epistemically 
demanding. As a matter of fact, the breadth of information required has become a growing 
contemporary concern among comparative human rights lawyers. 
Given the universal scope of international human rights law, CHRL, when it encom-
passes domestic, comparative international and international-domestic human rights law, 
should endeavour to include as many states and legal traditions as possible. This raises 
difficulties in terms of the availability, but also of the accessibility and sheer digestability, of 
the comparative material. The consequences of those difficulties are well-known: the more 
universal human rights comparison tends to be, the more selective (e.g. focusing on a given 
legal culture (e.g. Europe, the Commonwealth or the West) or using a single language 
(e.g. English)) and/ or superficial they become. 93 
There are three potential solutions: the turn to quantitative methods in CHRL (Section V.1), 
the development of (trans-)regional human rights comparison (Section V.2) and, finally, the 
generalization of CHRL in universal human rights treaty bodies (Section V.3). 
1. Methods: Quantitative Studies in Comparative 
Human Rights Law 
Recent years have seen a turn to quantitative or empirical comparative methods in compara-
tive constitutional law, but also, by inclusion, in CHRL.94 This development has the virtue of 
securing the kind of global comparative information which the universal scope of CHRL 
requires. Some of its proponents argue that it is actually its main comparative advantage over 
more traditional 'qualitative' or normative discussions in CHRL whose narrow focus on issues 
of authority and legitimacy cannot hope, so they say, to meet the need for 'global data 95 
Among the critiques put forward against this empirical turn, one should first mention 
the reduction of law and legal reasoning, and hence of eminently normative material, to 
numbers.96 It seems difficult indeed to think that one could code the normative content 
of human rights or the justifications of human rights' restrictions, and then reduce them to 
binary (yes/no) models. 
A second set of critiques pertains to the well-identified traps in comparative law and into 
which the quantitative method may lead us. It suffices to refer here to the formalistic focus 
9 3 See Ewald (n 29), 289. 
· 9 4 See, e.g., Christof Heyns and Frans Viljoen, 'The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaties on the Domestic Level', (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 3, 483 ff; Zachary Elkins, Tom 
Ginsburg and Beth Simmons, 'Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence and 
Human Rights Practice', (2013) 54 Harvard International LJ 1, 61 ff; Hirschi (n 3), 270. 
9 5 See Law and Versteeg (n 7), 1167. 
96 See, e.g., Alain Supiot, 'Comparative Law between Globalisation and Mondialisation', in Samantha 
Besson, Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, and Samuel Jube (eds), Comparing Comparative Law (2017), 209 ff. 
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on constitutional or international legal texts instead of their interpretations in practice, on 
the one hand, and to the difficulty of assessing whether the background conditions for the 
citation of foreign decisions are given when resorting to statistics, on the other. 97 The former 
matters especially in CHRL because human rights are often guaranteed in very similar 
abstract terms across both international human rights law and domestic human rights law, 
even though they do not necessarily give rise to the same interpretations or have the same 
relevance in practice. 
A third critique focuses on the concepts and terms used by quantitative CHRL accounts, 
and in particular those that stem from the commercial lexical context, such as 'import' or 
'export' of human rights norms or 'competition' between human rights regimes.98 It is diffi-
cult to see what justifies framing norms like human rights that are anti-utilitarian norms 
par excellence into this commodifying straightjacket. If one is to take the accusation seriously 
that international human rights law has become the 'powerless companion' of economic 
neo-liberalism in the last thirty years or so,99 it is important to make sure CHRL is not put 
to the same use as other methods in human rights reasoning (e.g. proportionality).100 While 
it is correct to consider that our world has become global, this need not imply that the law, 
and especially human rights law, should also be turned into global commodities that may 
be generalized101 and then transplanted everywhere like market products.102 
In reaction, tenants of the empirical method in CHRL have questioned the 'factual prem-
ises' of normative accounts of CHRL.103 They claim that without quantitative studies, more 
'traditional' ones would not get the facts about human rights law right. Yet, it is difficult to 
understand what they mean by 'factual premises' in the human rights context. It is also 
unclear why mathematical economics rather than, for instance, history of public law and 
institutions would be the best way to elucidate them. 
A second answer to those critiques of quantitative methods may be that comparison is 
always about counting to some extent and, accordingly, that the empirical turn merely 
amounts to the latest stage in the development of comparative methods in general. While 
this is true, one should emphasize that it does not reduce comparison, and human rights 
comparison in particular, to a counting exercise. It is crucial to discuss what is 'counted' and 
how, and then how the similarities or dissimilarities are 'accounted' for normatively. To that 
extent, there is much to be said in favour of Alain Supiot's and Waldron's rejection of the 
Condorcetian jury theorem approach to comparative law and of their endorsement, for 
Supiot, of Montesquieu's cultural approach 104 and, for Waldron, of Aristotle's experimental 
approach. 105 
A final response to the proposed critiques of quantitative methods in CHRL may be that 
the latter are part of the transformation of CHRL into a science. 106 This concern for scientific 
quality has actually been a common development in other comparative disciplines since 
the nineteenth century. 107 While it is true that methodological discussions are signs of the 
97 See Ewald (n 29), 29-30. 98 See, e.g., Law and Versteeg (n 7). 
99 See Samuel Moyn, 'A Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age ofNeoliberalism', (2014) 77 
Law and Contemporary Problems 4, 147 ff. 
100 See also McCrudden (n 5), 530. 
101 See, e.g., David S. Law, 'Generic Constitutional Law', (2005) 89:3 Minnesota LR 652 ff. 
102 See also Supiot (n 97), 216-7. 103 See Law and Versteeg (n 7), 1248. 
104 See Supiot (n 97). 105 See Waldron (n 2), 85-9. 106 See, e.g., Hirschl (n 3). 
107 McCrudden (n 13), 70. 
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maturity of the discipline, this does not mean that human rights comparison is best considered 
as a science in itself- especially when this means cutting comparison off from politics and 
morality. Nor does its scientific dimension, were it granted, imply that the only way to practice 
human rights comparison as a science is to endorse quantitative methods from the social or 
economic sciences rather than qualitative methods that mark the specificity oflegal reason-
ing, including its inherently comparative specificities. Legal reasoning is neither purely 
empirical to the extent that it is not about establishing facts, nor purely moral to the extent 
that it is not only about moral justification. 108 When one knows how scientific methods 
grew out of the Roman law comparative techniques of legal disputes and their development 
in the medieval judicial process, it is ironic to read that comparative legal reasoning should 
now be expected to find its inspiration in scientific methods. Comparative legal reasoning 
was always a part of the lawyers' methods, whether scientific or not, and well before the 
empirical turn in social sciences. 
2~ Scope: Regions in Comparative Human Rights Law 
An alternative solution to the problem of accessibility of universal comparative material in 
CHRL may lie in the turn to (trans-)regional comparison in human rights law instead of, or 
in addition to, (trans-)national comparison.109 Comparative methods can remain qualitative 
or normative, and focus on human rights legal reasoning, while still processing comparative 
material on a universal scale. 
Comparing human rights practice across regions, rather than states, may indeed ease the 
comparative process and can be justified as an intermediary stage in universal CHRL and 
especially in the context of the two United Nations (UN) Covenants. Looking for (trans-) 
regional human rights consensus could promote, through the identification of intermedi-
ary plateaux of transnational consensus, the consolidation of a universal consensus around 
interpretations of the Covenants' rights. 
Of course, one may wonder about the normative relevance of the regional unit of refer-
ence in international human rights law and, accordingly, of (trans-)regional comparison in 
CHRL. But for some exceptions, 110 indeed, most discussions in international human rights 
law have focused on regionalism as yet another case of fragmentation, rather than as a 
resource for human rights reasoning. 
True, regions are not duty-bearers under international human rights law and, when they 
seem to be human rights duty-bearers, it is as corresponding supranational political com-
munities and .under their own regional human rights law regime (e.g. under European 
Union law). At the same time, however, it is clear that regions are much more than a scholarly 
re-construction of geographical vicinity. Instead, they have legal relevance in international 
human rights law. Evidence for the role of regions in securing intermediary consolidations 
108 See also Waldron (n 2), 93-108. 109 See, e.g., Besson (n 39). 
no See, e.g., ChristofHeyns and Magnus Killander, 'Universality and the Growth of Regional System~', 
in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (2013), 670 ff; Enc 
Voeten, 'Competition and Complementarity between Global and Regional Human Rights Institutions', 
(2017) 8 Global Policy i, 119 ff; Alexandra Huneeus and Mikael Rask Madsen, 'Between Universalism and 
Regional Law and Politics: A Comparative History of the American, European and African Human 
Rights Systems', (2018) 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law i , 136-60. 
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of a universal transnational human rights consensus may be found in existing regional human 
rights practice.111 The latter indeed reveals the identification, through regional human rights 
interpretations, of common constitutional features across states in the region that are 
thicker than at the universal level.112 
Following Gerald Neuman, the comparative success of regional human rights systems in 
identifying and consolidating a transnational human rights consensus may be accounted 
for by reference to three features of those regimes: trust, effectiveness and expertise.113 
Regional human rights bodies staffed by neighbour states' nationals are indeed more likely 
to be trusted in interpreting human rights than universal bodies, to be effective in their 
claims to authority, and in enforcing human rights. They are also likely to know better how 
to interpret human rights in domestic socio-political and cultural circumstances. 
3. Actors: Universal Human Rights Bodies and 
Comparative Human Rights Law 
A third way of securing the universal scope of CHRL would be to broaden the scope of the 
actors involved in human rights comparison. To date, while domestic authorities tend to use 
comparison even outside of adjudication, the scope of international actors using human 
rights comparison has been limited to regional courts (e.g. ECtHR114 or Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights115). Human rights comparison should be generalized to all international 
human rights treaty bodies, and especially the two UN Covenants' Committees, in order to 
identify a transnational human rights consensus on the universal plane as well. 116 
Arguably, this is already how state practice becomes consolidated as subsequent treaty 
practice into Covenants' law, thanks to the periodic reporting system and the Committees' 
concluding observations which are then re-imposed as such onto states thanks to the per-
petuation of this transnational human rights law-making cycle over time. In that sense, the 
way in which the Covenants' interpretations are developed is already truly transnational. 
It is important, however, to make this process even more comparative, and in particular to 
extend the use of human rights comparison to other procedures where Covenants' law is 
interpreted, such as general comments and individual views. Resorting to human rights com-
parison would actually enable the Committees to comply more strictly with the conditions 
of Art 31(3)(b) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties when interpreting the Covenants 
by reference to subsequent State practice. It could indeed help substantiating that state 
practice -and not the Committees' own practice, as it is too often the case. 
Of course, as I have just explained, human rights comparison on a state by state basis is 
more difficult to achieve on a universal scale. Thus, treaty bodies should primarily aim for 
(trans-) regional human rights comparison. The fact that domestic and regional institutions, 
and especially domestic and regional courts, increasingly resort to CHRL could, of course, 
be of great help to the Committees in this comparative endeavour. Such 'boilerplating' 
111 See Neuman (n 14), 108. 112 See also Heyns and Killander (n 111), 691 ff. 
113 See Neuman (n 14), 106; Heyns and Killander (n 111), 673-
114 See, e.g., McCrudden (n 46); Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich (n 46). 
115 See, e.g., Neuman (n 14). 116 See Besson (n 39). 
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should actually be encouraged on the same grounds. This comparison and search for 
consensus should be conducted in an inclusive and universal fashion to avoid privileging 
some states or regions over others and favouring a single-regional and hence parochial 
interpretation of the Covenants. 117 
From an institutional perspective, this may imply restructuring the Committees to create 
regional rapporteurs, to devolve some of their work to regional sub-committees or, at least, 
to hold regional meetings.118 In this respect, greater attention to regional human rights law 
in the Committees' deliberations could also compensate for the lack of proportional repre-
sentation of regions in the Committees' membership and to ensure better consideration of 
legal diversity across regions. 
Provided they can identify a trans-regional consensus on a given Covenants' interpretation 
through comparison, the Committees should demonstrate some deference to it and enforce 
it through their own interpretations of state duties. The Committees actually already do so, 119 
albeit not always by referring expressly to its comparative sources or by distinguishing between 
them.120 In other cases, they should grant states parties a broad margin of appreciation. 
Importantly, the existence of a transnational human rights consensus would not pre-empt the 
Committees' power to review and interpret Covenants' rights, and hence to reason in the way 
they think is best. Human rights comparison is only one of the dimensions of human rights 
reasoning and, as I explained before, its authority is of a non-peremptory kind. 
There are four potential objections to human rights treaty bodies resorting to CHRL and 
relying on the corresponding universal transnational human rights consensus. 
The first objection is that reducing the moral truth of human rights to what cannot be but 
a parochial consensus is not compatible with the universality of international human rights 
law.121 As I explained before, while it is correct to fear that the transnational consensus 
about human rights could be wrong about the universal moral truth of human rights, it is 
the best method we have from a social-moral epistemological perspective under circum-
stances of widespread and persistent reasonable disagreement about human rights. Its 
authority is also justified, secondly, by the egalitarian and democratic underpinnings of our 
common and hence transnational human rights project. It would be odd therefore not to 
trust all states, whose members' human rights are at stake, in the interpretation of those 
very rights. Granting a few alleged experts' conceptions of universal moral truth priority 
over a majority of democratic states is imperialistic and presumptuous at best, and risks 
becoming even more parochial than the transnational human rights consensus itself. 122 
The second objection to the use of CHRL by the Committees lies in the prevalence of 
non-democratic States among states parties, and thus in the danger of their inclusion in the 
117 See, e.g., Gerald Neuman, 'Standing Alone or Together: The Human Rights Committee's Decision 
in AP v Russian Federation', in Eva Brems and Ellen Desmet (eds), Integrated Human Rights in Practice: 
Rewriting Human Rights Decisions (2017), Ch 3. 
118 See Heyns and Viljoen (n 95), 513. 119 See Heyns and Killander (n 111), 688 ff, 695. 
120 See Neuman (n 118). 
121 See, e.g., Yuval Shany, 'All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?: Application of the Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine by the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee', (2017) Journal 
of International Dispute Settlement, 180- 198. For a discussion, see Samantha Besson, 'Subsidiarity in 
International Human Rights Law- What is Subsidiary about Human Rights?', (2016) 61 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 1, 69 ff. 
122 See also Heyns and Killander (n 111), 674, 695. 
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human rights comparison for the democratic legitimacy of the transnational consensus. 
As mentioned before, non-democratic States' practice should not be considered in the 
consolidation of the transnational consensus about human rights. This does not mean, 
however, that human rights comparison and the identification of a transnational consensus 
should be abandoned altogether. Instead, non-democratic States should be encouraged to 
become democratic, just as they ought to protect human rights. It would be paradoxical 
(or even a mark of bad faith) in any case to insist, on the one hand, on egalitarian grounds 
that all States including non-democratic States should be included in the determination of 
international human rights law and hence in the transnational human rights consensus, 
while, on the other, refusing at a later stage, this time on universality grounds, to take that 
consensus seriously because it is dominated or tainted by so-called 'pretenders' and could 
impose parochial and non-democratic conceptions of human rights. 123 
A third objection to the use of CHRL by the Committees could be the non-judicial and 
hence non-binding nature of the Committees' interpretations and decisions. In the absence 
of legal authority, the need for the justification of those interpretations and decisions may 
not seem as important, and the democratic and epistemic justifications of CHRL therein 
even less. Since the Committees act as if their interpretations and decisions were binding, 
however, they should be more concerned about their legitimacy if they want their findings 
to become binding one day. 
A fourth objection may be that the universal human rights consensus potentially identified 
by universal human rights treaty bodies could only be very thin, even when it is identified 
on grounds of the comparative human rights practice of democratic States. However, as 
I argued before, the recourse to regional human rights consensus, provided it is transregional 
enough, may provide a means by which to thicken the universal minimum consensus from 
the bottom up. As a matter of fact, contradictions between distinct regional human rights 
'consensuses' are not common.124 As explained, some regional human rights regimes, and 
especially the European and American ones, have adopted a comparative and hence univer-
salizing approach to the identification of their respective regional human rights consensus. 
In some cases, they have relied on explicit integration clauses in their human rights treaties, 
but the integration of other regional human rights consensuses also occurs upon their 
judicial bodies' own decision.125 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Comparative human rights law is en vogue, but its boundaries, methods, and authority are 
still in flux. The aim of this chapter has been to bring in some clarification in all three 
respects, while also developing a normative theory. In short, the chapter has argued that, 
unlike other areas of domestic and even international law, human rights law amounts to a 
necessarily comparative project, ie a law-making enterprise in which comparative law is 
123 See, e.g., idem, 673-4. 
124 See Heyns and Killander (nm), 688 ff; Huneeus and Madsen (nm). 
125 See, e.g., ECtHR, Demir and Baykara (n 49), para 85. See also Neuman (n 14). 
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not only interesting, but required and in which it should not only amount to a piecemeal 
and retail practice, but to a systematic and universal one. 
Over the last seventy years or so, human rights have become a common project of 
humanity. True, that project started as a parochial one, ie mostly as a European and 
Christian enterprise, and it is often accused of still being such today-just as its counterpart 
project in international law, ie democracy. Comparative human rights law amounts to a 
crucial epistemic instrument in this respect: it can secure both more inclusion by consider-
ing other democratic polities and legal orders' different but legitimate conceptions of human 
rights, on the one hand, and more self-reflectivity about our own human rights' conceptions 
by bringing ourselves to question what has become largely unquestionable in the Western 
culture, on the other. Human rights comparison is grounded in the universality of human 
rights in international human rights law, but takes into account their required local socio-
political contextualization in the specification and interpretation of their corresponding 
duties in domestic human rights law. 
Of course, human rights comparatists themselves are sometimes at risk of parochialism, 
and comparative methods should be devised, along the lines discussed in this chapter, so as 
to address concerns about their own universality. This is a critique that should be taken very 
seriously as it is only by being comparative that human rights can remain a truly common · 
project. Thus we should make sure not to mistake the universality of human rights across 
legal orders either for pre-legal or natural universal moral cores to be revealed or for generic 
commodities to be standardized and then imported and exported on a global scale. It is 
only by following this narrow and nuanced path that comparative lawyers can play their 
part in the pursuit of the human rights project. 
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